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Abstract. We present a tight security analysis of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol
taking into account the finite size effect of key distillation, and achieving unconditional
security. We begin by presenting a concise analysis utilizing the normal approximation
of the hypergeometric function. Then next we show that a similarly tight bound can
also be obtained by a rigorous argument without relying on any approximation.
In particular, for the convenience of experimentalists who wish to evaluate the
security of their QKD systems, we also give explicit procedures of our key distillation,
and also show how to calculate the secret key rate and the security parameter from
a given set of experimental parameters. Besides the exact values of key rates and
security parameters, we also present how to obtain their rough estimates using the
normal approximation.
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1. Introduction
The finite size effect is an important issue in practical quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems. The first detailed finite-size analysis for general coherent attacks was given
by Hayashi [1] using the normal approximation. Later, Scarani and Renner [2] gave a
simple analysis based on the quantum de Finetti Theorem, but their results are valid
only against collective attacks. Matsumoto and Uyematsu also gave a simple analysis
[3], but again, essentially valid only for collective attacks. Later, Tomamichel et al.
[4] gave a tighter bound with unconditional security by using the uncertainty relations
(see., e.g., [5, 6]).
In this paper, we present a concise analysis for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol [7] that takes the finite key effect into account and yields better key generation
rates, with and without relying on the normal approximation. Our analysis is valid for
general coherent attacks and thus our results guarantee the unconditional security. For
the sake of simplicity, we consider the case where the sender, Alice, has a perfect single
photon source. We also assume that Alice and the receiver, Bob, calculate an upper
bound on the phase error rate of a sifted key, from that of the corresponding sample bits;
hence the key generation rate can vary each time Alice and Bob run of the protocol.
Throughout the paper we use the security criteria with universal composability;
the same criteria as used by many researcher, particularly by Renner and his coworkers
[8, 9]. Hence our final goal is to show that the trace distance between the actual and
the ideal states can be bounded from above. However, in the mathematical analysis for
obtaining upper bounds on the trace distance, we do not use Renner’s approach based
on the smooth minimum entropy [8]. Instead, we bound the trace distance using the
argument by Shor and Preskill [10], as well as its modification by Hayashi [1]. In Section
3, by using these formalisms, we show that the trace distance can be bounded by using
the decoding error probability Pph of the virtual phase error correction; in other words,
the universally composable security can be guaranteed by bounding Pph. To the best
of our knowledge, our argument here is the first rigorous treatment of the universally
composable security based on the Shor-Preskill formalism, applicable to linear universal
hash functions with variable final key lengths.
As we shall also discuss at the end of Section 3, in order to achieve high key
generation rates and strong bounds on Pph simultaneously, it is crucial to estimate the
phase error rate psft of the sifted key with a high accuracy. Note here that the quantity
psft cannot be measured directly in the BB84 protocol. Hence in Section 4, we solve an
interval estimation problem on psft using the hypergeometric distribution Phg. Then by
using the obtained result, we give explicit bounds on Pph in Section 5. In particular,
in order to clarify the argument, we present two versions of analysis: We first derive a
simple bound that we call the straightforward bounds (Propositions 1 and 2); and then
next give a more complicated bound called the Gaussian bounds (Theorems 2 and 3),
which yield a better final key rate if the raw key is sufficiently large. For the both types
of bounds, we first present a simple analysis based on the normal approximation of the
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hypergeometric function (Proposition 1 and Theorem 2), and then next show that a
similarly tight bound can also be obtained by a rigorous argument without relying on
any approximation (Proposition 2 and Theorem 3).
Since this paper is not aimed only at theorists, but also at experimentalists who
wish to evaluate the security of their QKD systems, we include explicit procedures of
security evaluation. We begin in Section 2 by explaining explicit procedures of our key
distillation. Then after theoretical arguments of the security, we demonstrate in Section
6 how to use our theorems to calculate the secret key rate and the security parameter
(i.e., an upper bound on the trace distance) from a given set of experimental parameters.
Besides the exact values of key rates and security parameters, we also present how to
obtain their rough estimates using the normal approximation.
In order to show that our rates are indeed better than in existing literatures, e.g.,
Refs. [2, 4], we draw in Section 7 example curves of key generation rates (Figs. 1
and 2). There are several reasons for this improvement. First, our upper bounds are
close to the approximated value of the hypergeometric distribution obtained by the
normal approximation, while the existing results [2, 4] did not discuss the closeness
to the normal approximation. Second, in our method, the adversary’s information is
estimated in terms of the Shannon entropy, whereas in [2, 4] they use the minimum
entropy, which is a lower bound on the Shannon entropy. Finally, we use an error
margin that depends on the measured error rates of sample bits, while in Refs. [2, 4]
the margin is a constant.
We also treat the sacrifice bit length with the second order coding rate, which
draws the attention from information theory community [11, 12, 13]. The conventional
asymptotic theory treats the coding length with the first order coefficient. It is
impossible to treat the approximation value of the best error probability with the first
order coefficient of the coding length. However, it becomes possible if we consider the
coding length up to the second order coefficient. In this paper, we derive an asymptotic
approximation value of the upper bound of the universally composable security criterion
when the sacrifice bit length is given as the form nh(psmp)+
√
ng(psmp) with the measured
phase error rate, where a function g(psmp) of psmp will be given with a concrete form in
Section 4 (Theorem 4).
The differences from our previous papers are as follows. In Refs. [1], Hayashi
simply approximated the hypergeometric distribution by the normal distribution having
the same variance, without showing its validity. In this paper, we present a rigorous
analysis without relying on any approximation (Proposition 2 and Theorem 3), by using
upper bounds on the hypergeometric distribution obtained from the Stirling’s formula
and inequalities proved in Ref. [14, 15]. As mentioned above, we also included the first
rigorous treatment of the universally composable security based on the Shor-Preskill
formalism, applicable to linear universal hash functions with variable final key lengths.
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2. Description of Our QKD Protocol
We consider the following type of the BB84 protocol. This protocol differs from existing
versions (e.g., [1, 2, 3]) only in the phase estimation and the privacy amplification steps.
Generation of a Sifted Key and Sample Bits Alice and Bob start the protocol with a
quantum communication and obtain a sifted key of n bits and sample bits of l bits. Here
we assume that raw key bits are chosen from the uniform distribution. The sample bits
must be selected randomly, and a sifted key and the sample bits must be measured in
different bases.
For example, suppose that Alice and Bob exchange N qubits, choosing the x basis
with probability q, and the z basis with 1 − q. Then, on average, Nq2 bits coincide in
the x basis, and N(1− q)2 in the z basis. By assinging the x basis for a sifted key, and
the z basis for sample bits, they have n = Nq2, l = N(1− q)2.‡
Bit Error Correction Bob corrects bit errors in his sifted key using a linear error
correcting code. For example, as in Shor-Preskill’s case [10], Alice may announce a
random bit string XORed with her sifted key; or alternatively, as in Koashi’s case [16],
she may send a syndrome of her sifted key encrypted with a previously shared secret key.
In either case, Alice and Bob end up with n(1−fh(pbit)) bits of reconciled key krec, with
the bit error rate pbit of a sifted key. Here h(x) is the binary entropy function defined
as h(x) := −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x), and value f corresponds to the efficiency of
the error correcting code used. For practical codes, f ≃ 1.1. It should be noted that
here the sizes of bit error correcting codes are independent of the security, and thus
Alice and Bob may perform bit error correction by dividing a sifted key ksif of n bits to
arbitrarily smaller blocks.
In many cases, one needs to guarantee the correctness of the shared keys, that is,
one has to minimize the probability ǫcor that Alice’s and Bob’s secret keys do not match
and the protocol does not abort. One way for minimizing ǫcor is that Alice calculates
an r-bit hash value of her reconciled key krec using universal2 hash functions. Then she
encrypts it with the one-time pad using a previously shared secret key, and sends it
to Bob. Bob also calculates his own hash value, and if it does not match Alice’s, they
abort the protocol§. By doing this, we have ǫcor ≤ 2−r.
Estimation of the number of phase errors in the channel In order to use privacy
amplification properly and guarantee the security of a secret key, Alice and Bob need
to know an upper bound on the number of phase errors occurring in the channel. It
‡ In general, however, Alice and Bob may choose bases with different probabilities, and a sifted key
and sample bits may be chosen with arbitrary proportions from the two basis.
§ Another possibility is to continue protocol by exchanging supplementary information, such as an
additional syndrome, over the public channel, and try bit error correction again. In such case, the
supplementary information also needs to be encrypted with a formerly shared key.
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should be noted here that the phase error is a completely different concept from the bit
error mentioned above (for details, see Section 3). Since the phase error rate cannot
be measured directly in practical QKD systems, we estimate its upper bound from the
measured error rate of samples.
We denote the number of bit errors occurring in a sample bits by c, and the
corresponding bit error rate by psmp(c) := c/l. We also call the union of a sifted key
and the sample bits total bits, and denote the number of their bit errors by k. Hence
the error rate of total bits is given by p(k) := k/(n + l), and that of a sifted key by
psft(k, c) = (k − c)/n. Note here that measuring c corresponds to randomly sampling
phase errors in the total bits, because a sifted key and the samples are measured in
different bases. Due to this fact, the measured value of psmp(c) is used to estimate an
upper bound on psft(k, c). In the asymptotic limit n, l →∞, Alice and Bob may assume
psft(k, c) = psmp(c). In practical QKD systems, however, the two values differ in general
due to statistical fluctuations. Thus they obtain a statistically estimated upper bound of
psft(k, c) as a function of the measured value c, which we denote by pˆsft(c). Throughout
the paper, we make it a rule to denote an estimated upper bound of a random variable
v by vˆ. The explicit functional form of pˆsft,ε(c) is discussed later, and is given in Eq.
(25).
Privacy Amplification (PA) The estimated phase error rate pˆsft(c) can be used to obtain
an upper bound the amount of information that is leaked to Eve. In order to cancel
Eve’s information, Alice and Bob perform a classical data processing called privacy
amplification on the reconciled key krec to generate the secret key ksec; very roughly
speaking, PA randomizes and shrinks krec so that Eve’s information is canceled by the
remaining fraction that is unknown to Eve. The number of bits to be reduced in this
process (sacrifice bits) is determined from pˆsft(c) in the following manner.
We set two limits cmin and cmax (cmin ≤ cmax) on the sample bit error c, depending
on which Alice and Bob change their procedures.
• If cmax < c, Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
• If cmin ≤ c ≤ cmax, Alice and Bob generate a secret key as the hash value of their
sifted key by using a linear and surjective universal2 hash functions. The number
α(c) of sacrifice bits, i.e., the number of bits reduced in PA, is given by
α(c) = n⌈h (pˆsft,ε(c+ 2))⌉+D.
Here ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer larger than or equal to x. Hence, as a result,
they obtain a secret key ksec of G = n [1− fh(pbit)]− ⌈nh (pˆsft,ε(c+ 2))⌉ −D bits.
‖
‖ Note that key length G of (2) differs from the asymptotic case (l, n → ∞) essentially only in the
definition of phase error rate pˆsft,ε(c+ 2). Hence the estimation of pˆsft,ε(c+ 2) is the key point of our
finite size analysis.
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• If c < cmin, Alice and Bob generate a secret key in the same way as above, except
that they sacrifice α(c) = ⌈nh (pˆsft,ε(cmin + 2))⌉ +D bits for PA. As a result, they
obtain a secret key ksec of G = n [1− fh(pbit)]− ⌈nh (pˆsft,ε(cmin + 2))⌉ −D bits.
Alternatively, we can combine these three case as follows: Define the sacrificed bit length
α(c) to be
α(c) = ⌈nh (pˆsft,ε (max[c, cmin] + 2))⌉ +D. (1)
If c ≤ cmax, Alice and Bob sacrifice α(c) bits for PA and obtain the final key of length
G(c) = n [1− fh(pbit)]− α(c). (2)
If c ≥ cmax, they abort the protocol.
In practice, the most efficient implementation of PA is to use the Toeplitz matrices:
Alice and Bob select a bit-valued Toeplitz matrix M randomly by communicating over
the public channel, multiply it with a reconciled key krec modulo 2, and obtain the secret
key ksec = Mkrec (for details, see., e.g., [8, 17, 18]).
In this paper, we additionally require the surjectivity for all of hash functions. To
the best of our knowledge, the most efficient implementation of linear and surjective
universal2 functions is by using the modified Toeplitz matrix, introduced in [1, 17]; in
this case we replace M above by a concatenation M ′ = (I, T ) of the (square) identity
matrix I and a Toeplitz matrix T . Note that this modification M ′ is slightly more
efficient than M above. Also note that unlike M ′, the normal Toeplitz matrix M gives
a non-surjective map with a very small but nonzero probability; e.g., for M being an
all-zero or all-one matrix.
It should be noted here that, unlike in bit error correction, one is not allowed to
perform PA by dividing krec and ksec into smaller blocks, because doing so will destroy
the universal2 property of the (modified) Toeplitz matrix. Also note here that the both
key lengths, |krec| = n[1 − fh(pbit)] and |ksec| = G, are of order O(n). If one applies a
naive multiplication algorithm, the computational complexity (i.e., the processing time)
increases as O(n2) (i.e., O(n) per key), and thus becomes a severe bottle neck of the key
distillation. This is in fact the most explicit impact of the finite size effect on practical
QKD systems.
One way around this problem is to use an efficient multiplication algorithm for a
Toeplitz matrix and a vector exploiting the fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm (see,
e.g., [19]). The complexity of this efficient algorithm scales as O(n logn), or O(logn)
per bit, which can be regarded as a constant in practice. An actual implementation
shows that the throughput exceeds 1Mbps for |krec| = 106 on software, as demonstrated,
e.g., in Ref. [18].
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total bits sifted key sample bits
Number of bits n+ l n l
Number of errors k k − c c
Error rate p(k) = k
n+l
psft(k, c) =
k−c
n
psmp(c) =
c
l
Estimate of error rate
with error probability ε
pˆε(c) pˆsft,ε(c)
Table 1. Notations of the key lengths, total bits, and sample bits. Functions pˆε(c) and
pˆsft,ε(c) denote the estimated upper bounds of p(k) and psft(k, c), under the condition
that there are c errors in sample bits. Parameter ε denotes the probability that the
estimation fails. See Section 4 for details.
3. Security Criteria of the BB84 Protocol in the finite case
3.1. The security of QKD with universal composability
We employ the definition of the security of QKD with universal composability in the
variable length case [20]. In order to guarantee the security for our protocol, we need to
evaluate the security criteria with universal composability after the privacy amplification
[9]. In this paper, we apply the above definition with the variable length case to the
final state after the privacy amplification [21].
For this purpose, we describe all public information by x, including the choice of
a hash function (which corresponds, e.g., to “f” of [9]), and the length of the final
key (e.g., “m” of [20]). However, here we do not restrict ourselves with those two
cases; it may contain other public information, e.g., the choice of a code for bit error
correction. Hence the length m of the final key is of course a function of x. We denote
the probabilistic distribution of x in the actual protocol by Ppub(x).
Then we consider the Hilbert space HA ⊗HE ⊗HX , consisting of Alice’s final key
HA, Eve’s system HE , and the public information HX . We define HA = (C2)M with
M sufficiently large; so that when m(x) < M , Alice uses the (preassigned) subspace
of HA. Also, following [8], we define the composite system of E and X to be E ′,
i.e., HE′ = HE ⊗ HX . We denote by ρA,E|x the state of Alice and Eve after privacy
amplification, conditioned on public information x. Hence, the state after privacy
amplification takes the form ρA,E′ =
∑
x Ppub(x)ρA,E|x ⊗ |x〉〈x|.
In this notation, we consider conditional probabilities with respect to length m of
the final key. The actual protocol generates the final key of m bits with probability
Plen(m) :=
∑
x:m(x)=m Ppub(x). The public information x obeys the conditional
distribution P (x|m) := Ppub(x)
Plen(m)
; hence the conditional actual state given m is a density
matrix ρA,E′|m :=
∑
x:m(x)=m Ppub(x|m)ρA,E|x ⊗ |x〉〈x|. The corresponding ideal state
givenm is defined to be ρIdeal |m := ρmixA|m⊗ρE′|m, where ρmixA|m is the completely mixed state
in the m-qubit subsystem of HA, and ρE′|m := TrAρA,E′|m. Thus, under the condition
that the final key length is m, the universal compsable security can be guaranteed by
bounding the trace distance of these two states, i.e.,
∥∥ρA,E′|m − ρIdeal |m∥∥1 [9].
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Parameter m is a random variable in our protocol; hence following [20], we
define the universally composable security by bounding the average trace distance∑
m Plen(m)
∥∥ρA,E′|m − ρIdeal |m∥∥1. In this case, it is convenient to define ρIdeal :=∑
m Plen(m)ρIdeal |m. Then the average trace distance can be rewritten as
‖ρA,E′ − ρIdeal‖1 =
∑
m
Plen(m)
∥∥ρA,E′|m − ρmixA|m ⊗ ρE′|m∥∥1
=
∑
x
Ppub(x)
∥∥ρA,E|x − ρmixA|m(x) ⊗ ρE|x∥∥1 (3)
≤
∑
x
Ppub(x)
∥∥ρA,E|x − ρA|x ⊗ ρE|x∥∥1 (4)
+
∑
x
Ppub(x)
∥∥ρA|x − ρmixA|m(x)∥∥1 , (5)
where ρA|x := TrEρA,E|x. Hence one may instead bound the sum of the second and
the third lines. Here we used the fact that ρA,E′ =
∑
x Ppub(x)ρA,E|x ⊗ |x〉〈x| =∑
m Plen(m)ρA,E′|m for the first equality; and ρE′|m =
∑
x:m(x)=m Ppub(x|m)ρE|x ⊗ |x〉〈x|
for the second equality. The quantity of (5) measures the non-uniformity of Alice’s final
key; i.e., it gives the averaged distance between Alice’s partial state ρA|x and the ideally
mixed state ρmixA|m(x). Note that these two states equal when Alice and Bob choose a
surjective hash function, because we assume that Alice’s raw key obeys the uniform
distribution. In particular, if Alice and Bob use a hash function family which consists
only of surjective functions (such as the modified Toeplitz matirices [1, 17] mentioned
in the previous section), it suffices to bound (4) only.
3.2. Decoding error probability of the virtual phase error correction
We believe that the above definition of security based on the trace distance is the same
as the one used by Renner and others [8, 9]. Throughout the paper we employ this
definition of security. However, in the remaining part where we actually obtain upper
bounds on the trace distance, we do not use Renner’s approach based on the smooth
minimum entropy [8]. Instead, we bound the trace distance ‖ρA,E|x − ρA|x ⊗ ρE|x‖1
appearing in (4) using the well-known argument by Shor and Preskill [10], as well
as its modification by Hayashi [1]. As we shall see shortly, in these formalisms, the
trace distance is bounded from above by using the decoding error probability of the
(virtual) phase error correction¶, which can be identified with the privacy amplification
in the actual protocol. The first step of the proof is to consider a virtual protocol
where Alice and Bob correct bit errors as well as phase errors occurring in the quantum
channel (under Eve’s influence) by using the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code. By
correcting these two types of errors, Alice and Bob can guarantee that their virtual
channel (obtained as a result of quantum error correction) is noiseless and decoupled
from Eve; thus the key they exchange there is unconditionally secure. The second step
of the proof is to note that, from Eve’s view point, this virtual protocol is completely
¶ The probability that the (virtual) decoding algorithm fails to give a correct answer.
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indistinguishable from the actual protocol. By using this indistinguishability, the
security of the actual protocol follows automatically from that of the virtual protocol.
In these formalisms, phase error correction in the virtual protocol is transformed
to a simple classical data processing in the actual protocol. That is, Alice and Bob
do not need to perform phase error correction in the actual protocol; instead it suffices
to perform a projection C1 → C1/C2, where C1, C2 are the classical CSS code. The
projection C1 → C1/C2 is often called privacy amplification (PA). This is why we often
identify PA with the virtual phase error correction in this paper+. (In Ref. [17], we have
shown that the projection C1 → C1/C2 can be replaced by an ε-almost dual universal2
hash function family.)
The original argument of Shor and Preskill was later improved in Refs. [22, 23],
where it was shown that the virtual phase error correction and the bit error correction
can be discussed separately. In fact the virtual phase error correction is essential for
guaranteeing security, while the bit error correction is necessary only for equalizing
Alice’s and Bob’s final keys. As a result of this observation, the trace distance
‖ρA,E|x − ρA|x ⊗ ρE|x‖1 of (4) can be bounded as [1]∥∥ρA,E|x − ρA|x ⊗ ρE|x∥∥1 ≤ 2√2√Pph|x, (6)
where Pph|x denotes the conditional decoding error probability of the virtual phase error
correction, given public information x. By taking the average of (6) with respect to x,
and by noting that the function a 7→ √a is concave, we have∑
x
Ppub(x)2
√
2
√
Pph|x ≤ 2
√
2
√∑
x
P (x)pubPph|x = 2
√
2
√
Pph, (7)
where Pph denotes the decoding error probability of the virtual phase error correction.
As to the non-uniformity of the final key given in (5), recall that we assumed that
Alice’s random variable obeys the uniform distribution. Then the left over hash lemma
[24, 25] yields ∑
x
Ppub(x)‖ρA|x − ρmixA|m(x)‖1 ≤
∑
x
Ppub(x)2
−α(x)
2 , (8)
where α(x) is the number of sacrifice bits in the privacy amplification.
Hence by combining (3)∼(5), (7), and (8) we obtain
‖ρA,E′ − ρIdeal‖1 ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pph +
∑
x
Ppub(x)2
−α(x)
2 . (9)
In other words, in order to guarantee the security with universal composability, it suffices
to bound the quantity on the right hand side of (9). In particular, as we have noted
below (5), the second term on the right hand side of (9) is exactly zero when all of the
hash functions are surjective; in this case the above inequality is replaced by
‖ρA,E′ − ρIdeal‖1 ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pph. (10)
+ However, the actual protocol does not necessarily have a counterpart for any operation in the virtual
protocol. For example, the actual protocol has no operation corresponding to measurement of the
syndrome in the virtual protocol.
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Hence, in order to guarantee the universally composable security, it suffices to bound
Pph.
3.3. Conditional decoding error probability given k
In this subsection we show that, in order to bound the decoding error probability Pph
of the virtual phase error correction, it is sufficient to bound Pph|k for all k, where Pph|k
denotes the corresponding conditional probability given k. We also show that a bound
on Pph|k can be given in a concise form using the hypergeometric distribution Phg(c|k)
and binary entropies.
First note that, without loss of generality, Eve’s eavesdropping strategy can be
described by the probability distribution QEve(k) of k, which is the number of errors in
the total bits n+ l∗. Then Pph can be rewritten as Pph =
∑
kQEve(k)Pph|k, where Pph|k
denotes the conditional decoding error probability given k.
Next we consider the conditional probability Phg(c|k) of c given k; i.e., the
probability that c bits of errors are found in sample bits when there are k errors
in the total bits. Since sample bits are sampled without replacement, c obeys the
hypergeometric distribution for a fixed value of k:
Phg(c|k) :=
(
n
k−c
)(
l
c
)
(
n+l
k
) , (11)
with the average c¯ and the deviation σ given by
c¯(k) :=
lk
n+ l
, σn,l(k)
2 :=
knl(n + l − k)
(n + l)2(n + l − 1) . (12)
In the following, σn,l(k)
2 is simplified to σ(k)2. Hence values of k, c occurs with
probability QEve(k)Phg(c|k). (Here sample bits are sampled without replacement simply
because one cannot measure both the phase and the bit values of a qubit simultaneously,
and thus Alice and Bob cannot reuse the sample bits as a sifted key. If one could
somehow sample them with replacements, the hypergeometric distribution here would
of course be replaced by the binomial distribution, which is much simpler.)
Finally we consider the conditional decoding error probability Pph|k,c for fixed values
of k and c. In this case, the number of phase error patterns of total bits is bounded
from above by 2nh((k−c)/n) (see, e.g., Lemma 4.2.2, Ref. [29]). Due to the construction of
the procotocl, the number of the sacrificed bits α(c) is fixed. As we have shown in Ref.
[17], if Alice and Bob use a linear universal2 hash function family for PA in the actual
protocol, it can be considered as the situation in the virtual protocol where they use a
2-almost universal2 linear code family for phase error correction (i.e., a linear 2-almost
universal2 hash function family is used as the syndrome function for correcting phase
errors). Then the decoding error probability Pph|k,c of the virtual phase error correction
∗ In the general setting, Eve is allowed to use the superposition among different intgers k. In order to
treat such a case, we introduce the distribution QEve(k) here.
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can be bounded as
Pph|k,c ≤ Spa(k, c) := 2 · 2[g(k,c)]
−
= 2[g(k,c)]
−+1, (13)
g(k, c) : = nh ((k − c)/n)− α(c)
= nh ((k − c)/n)− nh (pˆsft(c+ 2))−D (14)
= nh (psfc(k, c))− nh (pˆsft(c+ 2))−D,
where [x]− := min(x, 0). It is easy to see that Inequality (13) holds when the completely
random matrices (a type of universal2 hash functions) are used for PA, as in Koashi’s
case [16]. It is also shown to hold when the Toeplitz matrices (another universal2
hash function family) are used for PA, by using the fact that dual matrices of the
Toeplitz matrices generate universal2 hash functions [1]. More generally, in Ref. [17],
we have further shown that Inequality (13) is valid when an arbitrary family of universal2
functions is used for PA.
Hence, to summarize, under Eve’s strategy QEve(k), error numbers k, c are
distributed by QEve(k)Phg(c|k). For fixed values of k, c, the virtual phase error correction
fails with a probability less than Spa(k, c) given in (13). Combining these probabilities,
we see that the decoding error probability Pph of the virtual phase correction can be
bounded as
Pph =
∑
k
QEve(k)Pph|k ≤
∑
k
∑
c
QEve(k)Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c) (15)
=
∑
k
QEve(k)Sav(k) ≤ max
k
Sav(k), (16)
where Sav(k) is defined by
Sav(k) :=
cmax∑
c=0
Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c). (17)
Since Eve’s strategy QEve(k) can be arbitrary, Pph can be bounded if and only if
maxk Sav(k) is bounded. Hence in what follows, we will concentrate on obtaining upper
bounds on maxk Sav(k).
As one can see from the definition of Spa(k, c) in (13), (14), a straightforward way
of minimizing maxk Sav(k) is to define the function pˆsft(c) so that it always gives a large
value; this corresponds to the situation where, looking at c, Alice and Bob always give a
pessimistic estimate pˆsft(c) that is much larger than the actual value psft(k, c). However,
as one can see from the definition of α(c) in (1) and the final key length G given in the
previous section, a large pˆsft(c) results in a poor key generation rate. Rather, in order to
achieve high key generation rates and the high-level security simultaneously, one needs
to minimize maxk Sav(k) by considering the contributions of the two factors, Phg(k|c)
and Spa(k, c). Hence we define pˆsft(c) so that it becomes as close as possible (and larger)
to the actual value psft(k, c), in the regions of k, c where Phg(c|k) is not negligible. This
is equivalent to the estimation problem of an upper bound of psft(k, c):
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(i) For a given c, we give a suitable choice of the estimated value pˆsft(c) for the phase
error rate of a sifted key. Alice and Bob use this value to calculate the value of α(c)
of (1), and obtain the final key length G. This will be done in Section 4.
(ii) With the suitable choice of pˆsft(c), we obtain a universal upper bound on the RHS
of (17) that is independent of k, and thus an upper bound of Pph♯. This will be
done in Section 5.
4. Upper confidence limit on the phase error rate psft(k, c)
Now let us turn to the definition of pˆsft(c). As mentioned above, since length l of sample
bits is finite in practical QKD systems, the phase error rate of a sifted key psft(k, c)
deviates from that of sample bits, psmp(c), due to statistical fluctuations. Hence, in
order to guarantee the security by privacy amplification, instead of psmp(c), one needs
to use the estimated upper bound pˆsft(c) of psft(k, c), defined with the statistical effect
taken into account.
As long as psft(k, c) is estimated larger than the actual value, i.e., pˆsft(c) > psft(k, c),
there is no loss of security, because then, more information is erased by the privacy
amplification than is actually leaked to Eve. On the other hand, however, one needs to
avoid a situation where psft(k, c) is estimated smaller as pˆsft(c) ≤ psft(k, c). In such a
case, the privacy amplification of the previous section does not work since [g(k, c)]− = 0.
Hence, at least as a necessary condition, the function pˆsft needs to satisfy that
Prk { c | pˆsft(c) ≥ psft(k, c) } > 1− ε for ∀k, (18)
where Prk {c|Q} denotes the probability that c occurs satisfying a condition Q, under
the hypergeometric distribution Phg(c|k). In order to maximize the key generation rate
for fixed values of l, n, we wish to minimize pˆsft(c) as small as possible. In statistics,
this corresponds to an interval estimation problem. That is, finding pˆsft(c) satisfying
(18) is to obtain an upper confidence limit on psft(k, c) from an observed value of c, with
significance level ε (see, e.g., [27]).
In the following, we derive the minimum estimate pˆsft,ε(c) = pˆsft(c) satisfying
the condition (18) under the normal approximation of Phg(c|k) by employing interval
estimation of k. Although there is a standard procedure found in every textbook for
this analysis (e.g., [27]), we reproduce it below for the sake of explanation. First we
define the normal distribution function by
Φ(x) :=
1√
2π
∫ ∞
x
exp(−y2/2)dy, (19)
and s(ε) as the deviation corresponding to ε, e.g.,
s(ε) = Φ−1(ε) (20)
♯ A similar analysis was given by Fung et al. [26]. However, they seem to evaluate Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c)
without the summation. This corresponds to the probability that a certain set of values k and c occur
and then the virtual phase error correction by Alice and Bob fails.
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such that ε = Φ(s(ε)). In what follows, we often abbreviate s(ε) to s. Then, by applying
the normal approximation to Phg(c|k), we have the relation
Prk { c | c ≥ c¯(k)− s(ε)σ(k) } > 1− ε (21)
for any integer k; that is, c ≥ c¯(k)−s(ε)σ(k) holds at least with probability 1−ε for any
integer k. Note that this condition is equivalent to (c− c¯(k))2 ≤ s(ε)2σ(k)2 or c ≥ c¯(k).
We rewrite this condition further as
(psmp − p)2 ≤ 4γp(1− p), or psmp ≥ p (22)
where p = k/(n+ l), psmp(c) = c/l, and
γ :=
s(ε)2n
4l(n+ l − 1) . (23)
The condition (22) is equivalent to p ≤ pˆε(c), where pˆε(c) is a solution of
(psmp − pˆε)2 = 4γpˆε(1− pˆε) given by
pˆε(c) :=
1
1 + 4γ
(
psmp + 2γ + 2
√
γ {psmp (1− psmp) + γ}
)
. (24)
That is, k/(n + l) = p ≤ pˆε(c) holds at least with probability 1 − ε for any integer k.
In other words, the rate pˆε(c) gives the upper bound of one-sided interval estimation of
p = k/(n+ l). Using this estimate, we define another function
pˆsft,ε(c) := (pˆε(c)(n+ l)− c)/n = (n+ l)pˆε(c)− lpsmp(c)
n
. (25)
Then, again, the inequality pˆsft,ε(c) ≥ psft(k, c) = (k−c)/n holds at least with probability
1 − ε for any integer k. As a result, by choosing pˆsft(c) as pˆsft,ε(c), we can satisfy the
condition (18). Throughout the paper, we will use these definitions of pˆε(c) and pˆsft,ε(c)
in calculating α(c).
Now two remarks are in order. First, if there are sufficiently many samples
(i.e., with l large and thus γ sufficiently small), the error number c has roughly the
same distribution, irrespective of whether the samples are picked up with or without
replacement. In such a case, as we mentioned under Eq. (12), the hypergeometric
distribution Phg(c|k) can be approximated by the binomial distribution. Indeed, to the
first order of
√
γ, the estimated value pˆε(c) of Eq. (24) can be approximated as
pˆε(c) ≃ psmp(c) + s
l
√
n
n+ l − 1 σbin(c)
= psmp(c) +
s
l
√
n
n+ l − 1
√
lpsmp(c)(1− psmp(c)),
where σbin(c) :=
√
lpsmp(c)(1− psmp(c)) denotes the deviation of the binomial
distribution with the error rate of the sample bits being psmp(c) = c/l. Furthermore,
by using the inequality psmp(c) +
s
l
√
n
n+l−1 σbin(c) ≤ psmp(c) + sl σbin(c), and by noting
that the larger pˆε(c) always gives better a security bound, we can instead use a simpler
approximation given by
pˆε(c) ≃ psmp(c) + s
l
σbin(c), (26)
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The approximated upper bound of (26) can also be obtained by an argument similar to
the above, with the hypergeometric distribution replaced by the binomial distribution.
This means that, for l sufficiently large, one can conclude that the phase error rate
p(k, c) of the total bits can be bounded from above by pˆε(c) of (26), which is simply the
measured error rate psmp(c) of the samples, plus s times its standard deviation
s
l
σbin.
The actual value deviates this bound only with a probability less than Φ(s); or in other
words, this estimation fails only with a probability less than Φ(s).
5. Upper bounds on the decoding error probability Pph
Throughout the paper, we assume that Alice and Bob perform the protocol specified in
Section 2, using the estimated upper bound pˆsft,ε(c) of (24) and (25), obtained in the
previous section. That is, we here substitute pˆsft,ε(c) for pˆsft(c) in (1), and as a result
of that, Alice and Bob use sacrifice bits of α(c) = h (pˆsft,ε(max[c, cmin])) +D in the PA
step. In this setting, we evaluate the decoding error probability evaluate Pph and obtain
several upper bounds.
5.1. The Straightforward Upper Bounds
In Section 3.3, we showed that, in order to bound Pph, it suffices to bound Sav(k) of (17)
for all values of k. In this subsection, we first present a simple evaluation of Pph, where
we divide the summation Sav(k), given in (17), into two regions of c. This method is
similar to those used in preceding literature [2, 3], and we call it here the straightforward
method.
For each value of k, we set the boundary value cbnd(k) := ⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋, and divide
the summation of (17) as
Sav(k) =
cmax∑
c=0
Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c) (27)
≤
⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋∑
c=0
Phg(c|k) +
cmax∑
c=⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋+1
Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c) (28)
≤
⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋∑
c=0
Phg(c|k) + max
c∈[c¯(k)−sσ(k),cmax]
Spa(k, c). (29)
(In what follows, we often write c¯, σ, s instead of c¯(k), σ(k), s(ε).) Then, by using
the properties of pˆsft,ε(c) given in the preceding section, the two terms of (29) can be
evaluated as follows:
(i) The first summation of (29) is the probability Prk { c | c < c¯(k)− s(ε)σ(k) }. As
we have shown in the preceding section, this term is less than ε (see (21)), if one
applies the normal approximation to Phg(c|k). To put it more explicitly, apply the
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normal approximation of the form:
b∑
c=a
Phg(c|k) ≃ 1√
2π
∫ ζb
ζa
e−x/2dx (30)
with ζc := (c − c¯(k))/σ(k). Then it follows that the first term of (29) is less than
Φ(s(ε)) = ε, where Φ(s) is the normal distribution function given in (19).
(ii) In the second term of (29), the function Spa(k, c) = 2
[g(k,c)]−+1 is maximized at
c = c¯(k) − sσ(k), because g(k, c), defined in (14), is decreasing with c. Also note
that
pˆsft,ε(c¯(k)− sσ(k)) = psft(k, c¯(k)− sσ(k))
holds by the definition of pˆsft,ε(c), given in (24) and (25).†† Thus from (14), we
have
g (k, c¯(k)− sσ(k)) = nh (psft(k, c¯(k)− sσ(k)))− α (c¯(k)− sσ(k))
≤ nh (psft(k, c¯(k)− sσ(k)))− nh (pˆsft,ε (c¯(k)− sσ(k)))−D = −D
For the inequality of the second line, we used the fact that α(c) =
h (pˆsft,ε(max[c, cmin] + 2)) ≥ h (pˆsft,ε(c)). This means that the second summation
of (29) can be bounded by 2−D+1. We remark that, unlike the first term of (29),
this upper bound is valid without relying on the normal approximation.
Note here that the both bounds are valid for all values of k. Hence by combining these
two upper bounds, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For a given ε (and the corresponding s(ε) = Φ−1(ε)), suppose that
cmin ≤ cmax, and that Alice and Bob perform the QKD protocol specified in Section 2.
Then by applying the normal approximation to Phg(c|k), Pph can be bounded as
Pph ≤ max
k
Sav(k) ≤ ε+ 2−D+1. (31)
If one wishes to bound Pph by a certain value, say Pmax, a convenient choice
of parameters is ε = 2−D+1 = 1
2
Pmax, or equivalently, D = 2 − log2 Pmax and
s = Φ−1(ε) = Φ−1
(
1
2
Pmax
)
.† Then Inequality (10) guarantees that the trace distance
is bounded as ‖ρA,E′ − ρIdeal‖1 ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pmax, if Alice and Bob use a universal2 hash
function family that consists of linear and surjective functions.
Further, if parameters l and n are sufficiently large, we can also obtain a tight bound
on the first term of (29) without relying on the normal approximation of Phg(c|k).
†† In fact, this is exactly the way we planned when we defined pˆsft,ε(c): As mentioned in sentences
below (46), the function pˆε(c) is defined so that the condition pˆε(c¯(k) − sσ(k)) = p(k) is satisfied for
all k. This condition is equivalent to pˆsft,ε(c¯(k) − sσ(k)) = psft(k, c¯(k) − sσ(k)), due to definitions of
pˆsft,ε(c) and psft(k, c) given in (25) and in Table 1.
† Of course, the optimal choice is to let ε = aPmax and 2−D+1 = (1−a)Pmax, and then find the optimal
0 < a < 1 that yields the largest key generation rate. However, we do not pursue this optimality in the
rest of the paper, since varying a contributes very little to the key rate in typical situations.
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Lemma 1 If 5
4
s(ε)2 ≤ l ≤ n, 1 ≤ k, and cmax ≤ 0.12l, we have
min(⌊c¯−sσ⌋,cmax)∑
c=0
Phg(c|k) ≤
√
n + l
n
√
s(ε)2 + 2π
2
eµε, (32)
where µ := 1/(6n) + 1/(12). Note that this bound holds rigorously, without relying on
the normal approximation of Phg(c|k).
This lemma will be proved in Appendix B.3.
Now recall that the upper bound 2−D+1, obtained above for the second term of (29),
does not rely on any approximation either. Hence, besides Proposition 1, we can obtain
another bound on Pph that is similarly tight, and is valid rigorously without relying on
any approximation:
Proposition 2 Suppose that 5
4
s(ε)2 ≤ l ≤ n, and cmax ≤ 0.12l are satisfied for a given
ε (i.e., with Φ(s) = ε). Also assume that Alice and Bob perform the QKD protocol
specified in Section 2. Then without using the normal approximation of Phg(c|k), we
have
Pph ≤ max
k
Sav(k) ≤
√
s(ε)2 + 2π
2
√
n+ l
n
eµε+ 2−D+1. (33)
5.2. The Upper Bounds by The Gaussian Integration
In the above analysis of the straightforward bounds, if one wishes to bound Pph by a
certain value, say Pmax, it is necessary to let D ≥ 1− log2 Pmax. Hence, if one choose a
very small Pmax in order to achieve a high level security, this D can decrease the final
key length severely through the sacrificed bit length (1).
In this subsection, we derive improved bounds that holds with D = 1. We call
them here the Gaussian bounds for the following reason. The first step of the analysis
is similar to that of the previous section; i.e., we divide the summation of Sav(k) as
in (28) and obtain upper bounds for each term. For the first term of (28), we use the
normal approximation (30) again and bound it by ε. However, for the second term of
(28), we employ a quite different strategy: We approximate Phg(k|c) by using (30), and
also upper bound Spa(k, c) by an exponential function of a simple linear function of c
(specified below in (35)). By using this simple form, we evaluate the summation over
c as a Gaussian integral. As a result of this integration, instead of 2−D+1 appearing in
the previous subsection, we obtain an upper bound δε on the second term, with δ being
small for large l, n.
In order for this strategy using the Gaussian integration to work properly, parameter
k must be confined to a specific region. Thus as a preparation, we consider the following
three cases depending on the value of k:
(i) If k is too small (i.e., 0 ≤ k ≤ ncmin/l), it can be shown that Spa(k, c) is always
bounded by ε, by using the properties of g(k, c). Thus Sav(k) ≤ ε.
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(ii) For the intermediate domain where ncmin/l ≤ k ≤ (n + l)pˆsft,ε(cmax), the function
g(k, c) (used for Spa(k, c) = 2
[g(k,c)]−+1) can be bounded from above by a simple
function, i.e., a constant or a linear function of c.
(iii) If k is too large (i.e., (n + l)pˆsft,ε(cmax) ≤ k), we can also show that Sav(k) is less
than
∑c¯−sσ
c=0 Phg(c|k).
The more precise argument will be given in Appendix C, and we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 Let D = 1. If cmin ≤ cmax and 2 ≤ s(ε), then Sav(k) is bounded from above
as follows
• (Case 1) If 0 ≤ k ≤ ncmin/l,
Sav(k) ≤ ε. (34)
• (Case 2) If ncmin/l < k ≤ (n + l)pˆsft,ε(cmax), for an arbitrary possible outcome c,
we have
Spa(k, c) ≤ min
(
2−β(c−(c¯−sσ+1)), 1
)
, (35)
where
β :=
1
1 + 4γ
n + l
l
h′(pˆsft,ε(cmax)). (36)
Thus
Sav(k) ≤
min(⌊c¯−sσ⌋,cmax)∑
c=0
Phg(c|k)
+
cmax∑
c=⌊c¯−sσ⌋+1
Phg(c|k)2−β(c−(c¯−sσ)+1). (37)
• (Case 3) If (n + l)pˆsft,ε(cmax) ≤ k, then cmax ≤ c¯ − sσ holds by the definition of
pˆsft,ε(c). Hence
Sav(k) ≤
cmax∑
c=0
Phg(c|k) ≤
⌊c¯−sσ⌋∑
c=0
Phg(c|k). (38)
(For the proof of this theorem, see Appendix C.) We stress that the normal
approximation to Phg(c|k) is not yet applied, and thus all inequalities are rigorous at
this stage‡
Then in the rest of this subsection, we will show that the right hand side of each
inequality of Theorem 1 can be bounded from above by (1 + δ)ε, with δ being smaller
than one for sufficiently large l, n. In other words, we obtain an upper bound on Sav(k)
that is valid for all k; and thus an upper bound on Pph (recall the argument of Section
3.3). can be bounded from above by (and thus Pph) from above by ε. Let us first discuss
‡ It is true that we used the normal approximation in deriving pˆsft,ε(c) in (25) and (24), and that pˆsft,ε(c)
is used in the statement of Theorem 1. However, in the proof of Theorem 1 we use no approximation;
thus the theorem holds rigorously, without any approximation.
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the easier cases, namely, Cases 1 and 3. As mentioned above, for these two cases Sav(k)
can be easily shown to be less than ε: For Case 1, it is already proved in Theorem 1.
For Case 3, if one applies the normal approximation to Phg(c|k), Sav(k) is bounded by
ε, as can be seen by the same argument as in the previous section (see the paragraph
of (30)).
Hence it remains to evaluate Case 2, where parameter k is restricted as ncmin/l <
k ≤ (n+ l)pˆsft,ε(cmax). As mentioned above, we here show that Sav(k) can be rewritten
as the Gaussian integration in this case. In Inequality (37), the first term on the
right hand side can be bounded by ε, with the approximation applied to Phg(c|k).
For the second term, which is a summation over c, we replace Phg(c|k) with the the
normal approximation. In addition to that, we replace Spa(k, c) appearing in the same
summation by the right hand side of (35). Then the summation can be rewritten a
Gaussian integral:
cmax∑
c=⌊c¯−sσ⌋
Phg(c|k)2−β(c−(c¯−sσ)+1) (39)
≃ 1√
2π
∫ (cmax−c¯)/σ
−s
exp
[
−x
2
2
− s (x+ s) ξε(k)
]
dx.
≤ 1√
2π
∫ ∞
−s
exp
[
−x
2
2
− s (x+ s) ξε(k)
]
dx. (40)
= e
1
2
ξε(ξε−2)s2 1√
2π
∫ ∞
(ξε−1)s
e−x
2/2dx (41)
=: I2 (ξε(k)) ,
where
ξε(k) := (ln 2)βσ(k)/s(ε).
Further, in order to bound I2 (ξε(k)) using ε, we introduce the inequalities√
2√
x2 + 2π
e−x
2/2 ≤ Φ(x) ≤
√
2
x
e−x
2/2, (42)
where Φ(x) is the normal distribution function given in (19). (Inequalities (42) will
also be proved in Appendix C.) By using (42), the integral I2 (ξε(k)) can be evaluated
further as
I2 (ξε(k)) ≤
√
1 + 2πs−2
ξε(k)− 1 Φ(s(ε)) =
√
1 + 2πs−2
ξε(k)− 1 ε. (43)
Note here that σ(k) is an increasing function of k, because ξε(k) is. Thus the final term
of (43) is maximized at the lower boundary k = ncmin/l, and we obtain finally
I2 (ξε(k)) ≤
√
1 + 2πs−2
ξmin,ε − 1 ε (44)
with ξmin,ε := ξε(ncmin/l). We now have the following theorem:
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Theorem 2 For a given ε, suppose that cmin ≤ cmax, 2 ≤ s(ε) and 1 < ξmin,ε with
ξmin,ε := ξε(ncmin/l) (45)
=
(n + l) ln 2
s(ε)l(1 + 4γ)
h′ (pˆsft,ε(cmax)) σ(ncmin/l).
Here pˆsft,ε(c) is defined in Eq. (25), σ in Eq. (12), and h
′(x) = log2
(
1−x
x
)
. Also assume
that Alice and Bob perform the QKD protocol specified in Section 2. Then with the
normal approximation applied to Phg(c|k), Pph can be bounded as
Pph ≤ max
k
Sav(k) ≤ (1 + δ)ε, (46)
where
δ :=
√
1 + 2πs(ε)−2
ξmin,ε − 1 . (47)
Note here that none of cmin, pˆsft,ε(cmax) or γ depends on k or c, which can vary for
each run of the protocol; thus ξmin,ε can be calculated as a fixed value specified by the
protocol. (In other words, ξmin,ε is the constant and thus calculated at the preparation
stage prior to the protocol.)
Further, as we have done in the previous subsection, if parameters l and n are
sufficiently large, we can also obtain a similarly good bound without relying on the
normal approximation of Phg(c|k) (in Eq. (30)). By using exact upper bounds on
Phg(c|k) including Lemma 1, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Suppose that 1 ≤ l ≤ n, s2 ≤ cmin ≤ cmax ≤ 0.12l, and 1 < ξmin are
satisfied for a given ε. Also assume that Alice and Bob perform the QKD protocol
specified in Section 2. Then without using the normal approximation of Phg(c|k), we
have
Pph ≤ max
k
Sav(k) ≤ Pph,ε(cmin, ξmin,ε), (48)
where
Pph,ε(cmin, ξmin,ε) :=
√
s(ε)2 + 2π
2
√
n+ l
n
eµε (49)
+

√1 + 2πs(ε)−2
ξmin,ε − 1
eµ+ν√
1− s(ε)√
cmin
+ ε

 ε,
where µ = 1/(6n) + 1/12, ν = 1/(12l) + 1/(2(n+ l − 1)).
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix D.
5.3. Second Order Asymptotics
Now, we roughly estimate the relation between the sacrifice bit length and the upper
bound maxk Sav(k) of the phase error. For this purpose, we focus on the asymptotic
expansion for the sacrifice bit. In the protocol discussed in the above, the sacrifice
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bit length α(c) is ⌈nh (pˆsft,ε(c+ 1))⌉ + 2 with pˆsft,ε(c) = (n+l)pˆε(c)−lpsmp(c)n and pˆε(c) :=
1
1+4γ
(
psmp + 2γ + 2
√
γ {psmp (1− psmp) + γ}
)
. When the ratio l/n is t, we obtain the
asymptotic expansion:
⌈nh (pˆsft,ε(c+ 1))⌉+ 2 = nh (psmp(cmin)) +
√
ngt(psmp(cmin)) + o(
√
n),(50)
where gt(x) := h
′ (x)
√
x(1−x)(1+t)
4t
s(ε). When we use only the first term in the above
expansion, the upper bound maxk Sav(k) for the phase error converges to zero or one.
The limit value zero or one cannot be used for the approximation for the upper bound
maxk Sav(k) because the real value of the upper bound maxk Sav(k) takes a value between
zero and one, which is different from zero or one.
However, when we use up to the second order
√
n in the asymptotic expansion of
α(c), the upper bound maxk Sav(k) converges to a value between zero and one. In this
case, we can use the limit for the approximation for the upper bound maxk Sav(k). That
is, by using the above asymptotic expansion, the virtual phase error can be abounded
as the following way.
Theorem 4 For a given ε, pmin, and pmax, we choose cmin and cmax as pminl and
pmaxl, and assume that l/n = t. Also suppose that Alice and Bob perform the QKD
protocol specified in Section 2, except that the sacrifice bit length α(c) is less than
nh (psmp(cmin)) +
√
ngt(psmp(cmin)) for c ∈ [cmin, cmax]. Then, the maximum Pph,n,l of
Sav(k) with given n and t can be asymptotically characterized as
lim
n→∞
max
l:l≥tn
Pph,n,l ≤ ε. (51)
The proof will be given in Appendix E.
6. How to use the above formulas to evaluate the security of one’s QKD
system
In this section we summarize what we have proved so far, and then explain how one can
use Proposition 1 or 2, or Theorem 2 or 3 to evaluate the security of one’s QKD system.
6.1. Summary of Our Results
As discussed in Section 3, the standard quantitative measure of the security of QKD
is the trace distance ‖ρA,E′ − ρIdeal‖1 between the actual state ρA,E′ and the ideal state
ρIdeal, given in (3). Inequalities (9) and (10) claim that this trace distance can be
bounded from above by the averaged decoding error probability Pph of the virtual
phase error correction. Throughout the paper, we are interested in bounding Pph by
using the Shor-Preskill’s formalism. Also in Section 3, we have shown that in order
to bound Pph under an arbitrary attack by Eve, it suffices to bound the probability
maxk Sav(k), with Sav(k) defined in (17) (or equivalently, for all k, one needs to bound
Sav(k) by a certain value). Here the function Sav(k) gives an upper bound on the failure
probability Spa(k, c) of the virtual phase error correction, averaged with respect to the
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hypergeometric distribution Phg(c|k). Our analyses of Sections 4 and 5 are devoted for
obtaining an upper bound on maxk Sav(k).
In Section 4, we determined the suitable functional form of the upper bound pˆsft(c)
on the phase error rate pˆsft(k, c) of the sifted key, such that we can achieve high key
generation rates and the high-level security simultaneously. The function pˆsft(c) is used
for calculating the sacrifice bit length α(c) of Eq. (1), i.e., the number of bits that needs
to be erased in privacy amplification (PA). This problem can be reduced to determining
an upper bound on parameter k, or equivalently, that on the phase error rate psft(k, c)
of a sifted key. For this purpose, we derived an upper bound pˆsft,ε(c) of Eqs. (24) and
(25) on psft(k, c), as a function of the measured error rate psmp(c) = c/l of sample bits.
We here used the standard method of interval estimation, and the upper bound pˆsft,ε(c)
is defined so that, for any value of k, the undesired case psft(k, c) > pˆsft,ε(c) occurs with
a probability ≤ ε (see Eqs. (18) and (21)).
Then in Section 5, by using this pˆsft,ε(c) and the corresponding sacrificed bit length
α(c) given in (1), we obtained the upper bounds on Sav(k) that holds for all k. By the
argument of the paragraph of (17), this means that we have given upper bounds on Pph.
For the sake of simplicity, we first gave straightforward bounds in Proposition 1 (with
the approximated values of the hypergeometric distribution Phg(c|k)) and Proposition 2
(without any approximation). Next we gave the other bounds exploiting the properties
of the Gaussian integration, which yield larger final key length G for sufficiently large
l, n; namely, Theorem 2 (with the approximated Phg(c|k)) and Theorem 3 (without any
approximation).
6.2. How to Use The Straightforward Upper Bounds
6.2.1. The Straightforward Upper Bound With The Normal Approximation (How to Use
Proposition 1) Here we present how to calculate the secret key length of one’s QKD
system using the straightforward upper bound on Pph obtained in Propositions 1.
• Preparation steps:
(i) Determine one’s desired upper bound Tmax on trace distance.
(ii) Calculate the corresponding upper bound on the phase error rate by Pmax =
1
8
(Tmax)
2.
(iii) Let the confidence limit be ε = 1
2
Pmax. Then calculate parameter s = Φ
−1(ε),
as the inverse value of the normal distribution function Φ(x) (see the definitions
of Φ(x) and s(ε) given in (19), (20)).
(iv) Let D = ⌈2− log2 Pmax⌉.
(v) Determine cmin and cmax.
(vi) (Parameter check:) No parameter check is necessary for Proposition 1.
Under this setting of parameters, one can guarantee that Pph ≤ ε + 2−D+1 ≤ Pmax,
by applying the normal approximation to Phg(c|k) and by using Proposition 1. Then
Inequality (10) guarantees that the trace distance is bounded as ‖ρA,E′ − ρIdeal‖1 ≤
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2
√
2
√
Pmax = Tmax. (As specified below, we here assume that Alice and Bob use a
universal2 hash function family that consists of linear and surjective functions.)
• For each run of the protocol:
(vii) Perform the protocol as specified in Section 2. In particular in the PA step,
for the calculation of the length α(c) of (1), use pˆsft,ε(c) defined in Eqs. (24)
and (25), as well as parameters s and D obtained in the preparation steps
above.† Then use a universal2 hash function family that consists of linear and
surjective functions, to convert the reconciled key to the secret key.
As noted in Section 2, as a result of this protocol, Alice and Bob obtain the final key of
length G = nrec − α(c) with α(c) given in (1), and nrec being the reconciled key length.
If an error correcting code with efficiency f is used, we have nrec = n(1−fh(pbit)), with
pbit being the bit error rate of the sifted key. Thus Alice and Bob obtain the final key
of length G, given in (2).
6.2.2. The Straightforward Upper Bound Without Any Approximation (How to Use
Proposition 2) By using Proposition 2, an exact upper bound on Pph can be obtained,
without relying on the normal approximation of Phg(c|k). In this case all the steps are
the same as those given in Section 6.2.1, except for Steps (iii) and (vi):
(iii’) Choose parameter s such that√
n + l
n
√
s2 + 2π
2
eµΦ(s) ≤ 1
2
Pmax
is satified, where µ = 1/(6n) + 1/12.
(vi’) (Parameter check:) Check that 5
4
s2 ≤ l ≤ n and cmax ≤ 0.12l are satisfied. If not,
set Tmax smaller and restart from Step (i).
As a result of Step (iii’), we have ε = Φ(s(ε)) ≤ s−1 × 1
2
Pmax. This means that, for
a fixed value of Pmax, one needs to choose ε = Φ(s(ε)) to be smaller than that obtained
in Section 6.2.1, by a factor of s−1. As a result, s also turns out to be larger, one ends up
with a smaller final key length. Note, however, that such increment of s is negligible for
sufficiently large s (e.g., for s ≥ 10), because Φ(s) scales as e− 12 s2 and thus a very small
increment of s compensates the factor of s−1 in front of 1
2
Pmax. Hence the decrement in
the final key length is very small. We will demonstrate this fact in the next section by
a numerical calculation in Section 7.3.
6.3. How to Use The Upper Bounds by The Gaussian Integration (How to Use
Theorems 2 and 3)
As mentioned in Section 5.2, if parameters l and n are sufficiently large, we can set
D = 1 and still obtain similarly tight bounds on Pph as given in Theorems 2 and 3;
† Throughout this section, we neglect the deviation of l, n from their averages when the bases x, z are
chosen with a constant probability, and assume that they are constant.
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thereby we can improve the final key length G. For these cases too, we summarize how
to calculate the secret key length of one’s QKD system.
6.3.1. The Gaussian Bound With The Normal Approximation (How to Use The Bound
of Theorem 2) For Theorem 2, the preparation steps are modified as follows:
• Preparation steps:
(i) Determine one’s desired upper bound on trace distance Tmax.
(ii) Calculate the corresponding upper bound on the phase error rate by Pmax =
1
8
(Tmax)
2.
(iii) Set the confidence limit ε to be slightly smaller than Pmax. (For example,
if l, n are sufficiently large, ε = 0.9Pph is usually sufficient.) Then calculate
parameter s = Φ−1(ε), as the inverse value of the normal distribution function
Φ(x) given in (19).
(iv) Let D = 1.
(v) Determine cmin and cmax, such that the conditions in the first sentence of
Theorem 2 are all satisfied.
(vi) (Parameter Check:) Check if δ is small enough so that Inequality (46) is
satisfied. If not, go back to Step (iii) and set ε smaller.
After these preparation steps, Alice and Bob run the protocol as in previous
sections. That is, they run the protocol as specified in Step (vii) of Section 6.2.1.
6.3.2. The Gaussian Bound Without The Normal Approximation (How to Use The
Bound of Theorem 3) As we have done for the case of the straightforward bounds, we
also obtained in Theorem 3 the exact version of the Gaussian bound that does not rely
on the normal approximation of Phg(c|k). This theorem was derived using essentially
the same idea as Theorem 2 and achieves a similarly tight bound, but it does not rely
on any approximation.
For Theorem 3, the preparation steps are the same as Theorem 2 (i.e., the same as
in Section 6.3.1), except for Steps (v) and (vi):
(v”) Determine cmin and cmax, such that the conditions in the first sentence of Theorem
3 are all satisfied.
(vi”) (Parameter Check:) Check if δ′ is small enough so that Inequality (49) is satisfied.
If not, go back to Step (iii) and set ε smaller.
After these preparation steps, Alice and Bob run the protocol as in previous
sections. That is, they run the protocol as specified in Step (vii) of Section 6.2.1.
6.4. Rough Estimate of The Key Rate and The Security Parameter
We note here that if l, n are sufficiently large, parameters γ and δ becomes sufficiently
small, and the approximate evaluation of the key length G of (2) can be greatly
simplified.
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As one can see from Steps (i) and (ii) of Section 6.3, bounding Pph is enough for
the security. If δ is sufficiently small, then according to Theorem 2 (or or Step (iii) of
Section 6.3), Pph can be bounded approximately by ε, which determines the value of
pˆsft,ε(c) via Eqs. (24) and (25). Then as we discussed in the paragraph of Eq. (26),
if γ is sufficiently small, pˆsft,ε(c) =
n+l
n
pˆε(c) − lnpsmp(c) can be approximated by using
pˆε(c) ≃ psmp(c) + sl σbin(c).
As a result, if the conditions of the first sentence of Theorem 2 are satisfied for a
given set of experimental parameters, and if γ and δ are sufficiently small, one has the
following rough estimates. The trace distance is approximately bounded by the square
root of ε as
||ρA,E − ρIdeal|| ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pph,
Pph ≤ (1 + δ)ε ≃ ε.
Parameter s is chosen to be the deviation of the standard deviation, i.e., s = Φ−1(ε).
Then this s determines the final key length G as
G ≃ n [1− fh(pbit)− h (pˆsft,ε(c))] ,
pˆsft,ε(c) =
n+ l
n
pˆε(c)− l
n
psmp(c),
psmp(c) = c/l,
pˆε(c) ≃ psmp(c) + s
l
σbin(c)
= psmp(c) +
s
l
√
lpsmp(c)(1− psmp(c)).
We expect that these relation will be useful for experimentalists and theorists who wish
to obtain a rough estimate of the key length with the finite size effect taken into account.
7. Numerical results.
We demonstrate the tightness of our bound with numerical results. We consider a
quantum channel in the absence of eavesdropper, and assume that it can be described
as a binary symmetric channel with quantum bit error rate (QBER).
7.1. Case 1: Basis Choice with Probability q = 1
2
First, as a comparison to preceding literature [2, 4], we plot key rates for the case where
Alice and Bob choose the x and the z bases with the equal probability. We present
two types of evaluations given in Section 6; one is the analysis of Section 6.2.2 using
the straightforward bound of Proposition 2, the other is that of Section 6.3.2 using the
Gaussian bound of Theorem 3. Note that both these bounds are derived without using
the normal approximation; thus the all key generation rates obtained in this subsection
are rigorous.
We assume that Alice and Bob choose both the phase basis and the bit basis
with probability q = 1/2, and thus n = l = N/4. We also assume that Alice
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and Bob consume r = 40 bits of a previously shared secret key for exchanging the
hash value, in order to guarantee that ǫcor ≤ 10−12 (in the following, these r = 40
bits will be subtracted from the final key length G). Then we choose Pmax to be
Pmax = 0.98 × 18 × 10−20, so that the trace distance ‖ρA,E′ − ρIdeal‖1 is guaranteed
to be less than Tmax = 2
√
2Pmax = 0.99× 10−10. By these choices of parameters, we can
guarantee Tmax + ǫcor ≤ 10−10, which is the same condition as used in Ref. [4].
Because r = 40 bits are consumed for guaranteeing that Alice’s and Bob’s final
keys are equal, the effective final key length is G(c)− r, with G(c) defined in (2). Hence
in this section, we define the final key rate to be
R(c) :=
G(c)− r
n
(52)
=
1
n
[n (1− fh(c/l))− ⌈nh (pˆsft,ε(max{c, cmin}+ 2))⌉ − (D + r)] .
The efficiency of bit error correction is chosen to be f = 1.1.
7.1.1. The Straightforward Bound With the above choices of parameters, we perform
the analysis of Section 6.2.2, and obtain the corresponding final key rate R. Here we
restrict ourselves to the case where parameters l, n satisfy 125 ≤ l = n. Parameters
Pmax and Tmax are already specified above. As to parameter s, we follow Step (iii’) and
let s = 9.9, so that√
n + l
n
√
s2 + 2π
2
eµΦ(s) ≤
√
s2 + 2π e1/4Φ(s) ≤ 1.1× 10−22 ≤ 1
2
Pmax.
According to Step (iv), we choose D = ⌈2 − log2 Pmax⌉ = 79; next according to Step
(v), cmin = 0.01l and cmax = 0.12l. It is easy to verify that all these parameters are
compatible with the parameter checks of Step (vi’).
Then we assume that Alice and Bob perform the BB84 protocol (i.e., Step (vii)), in
the quantum channels with QBER = 1%, 2.5%, and 5%. The corresponding key rates
R(c) (with c = l ×QBER) are shown in bold curves in Fig. 1, versus n+ l.
7.1.2. The Gaussian Bound For the same choice of parameters q, r, Pmax, D, and for
the same ratio of cmax = 0.12l with respect to l, we perform the analysis of Section
6.3.2. The remaining parameters to be fixed are s and cmin; hence we here numerically
calculate the pairs of s and cmin that gives the best key rate R(c). That is, we first fix l
and n, and then search for the pair of s and cmin that is compatible with the parameter
check and gives the largest R(c). (This corresponds to repeating Steps (iii) through
(vi’) of Section 6.3.2, by letting ε smaller each time, until the largest key length G(c) is
obtained.) The results are shown in thin curves in Fig. 1.
As one can see from Fig. 1, if QBER=5%, the Gaussian bound gives better key
rate than the straightforward bound for all l, n. On the contrary, for smaller QBER
(1% and 2.5%), the straightforward bound becomes better for l, n ≃ 5000.
The dots in Fig. 1 represents the key rates obtained by Tomamichel et al. [4] under
the same condition. It can be clearly seen that our key rates R are better in all parameter
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regions. For example, Fig. 1 gives R = 0.19 for QBER = 5% and n + l = 104, while
Tomamichel et al. gave R = 0 in this region [4]. As n+l becomes larger, R converge very
fast to the asymptotic values; all three curves reach more than 80% of the asymptotic
values at n+ l = 2× 105.
In particular, as the key size becomes larger, R converge very fast to the asymptotic
values, more than 80% of the asymptotic values at n+ l = 2× 105. As we have noted in
Section 2, key distillation is quite practical even in this region. That is, the sizes of bit
error correcting codes are independent of security, and thus Alice and Bob may perform
bit error correction by dividing a sifted key of n bits to arbitrarily smaller blocks. As to
privacy amplification, one can use the efficient algorithm for the multiplication of the
(modified) Toeplitz matrix and a vector.
QBER=1%
QBER=2.5%
QBER=5%
1000 104 105 106 107 n+l
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
R
Figure 1. (Color online) Key generation rate R = (G − r)/n versus n + l, which is
the sum of lengths of a sifted key and sample bits. Here we assume that x and the z
bases are chosen with the equal probability, i.e., q = 1
2
. The typical QBER are chosen
to be 1% (red), 2.5% (blue), and 5% (black). As to the security, we set r = 40 and
Pmax < 0.98× 18 × 10−20, so that Tmax + ǫcorr ≤ 10−10. That is, the sum of the trace
distance and ǫcor is less than 10
−10. We have used two types of analysis to achieve this
value of Pmax: The bold curves represent the key rates based on the straightforward
bound given in Proposition 2 and in Section 6.2.2. The thin curves are based on the
Gaussian bound given in Theorem 3 and in Section 6.3.2. We stress that these curves
are obtained without using the normal approximation. Dots of the same color are the
rates obtained in Figure 2 of Ref. [4].
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7.2. Case 2: Optimized Basis Choice with Variable Probability q
Next, as a more practical setting, we consider the case where Alice and Bob choose the
x and the z bases with varying probabilities q, 1 − q (thus, l = q2N , n = (1 − q)2N).
Then we maximize the secret fraction F , defined by
F (c) =
G(c)− r
N
(53)
=
1
N
[n (1− fh(c/l))− ⌈nh (pˆsft,ε(max{c, cmin}+ 2))⌉ − (D + r)]
with respect a fixed raw key length N , where G denotes the final key length. We
use the analysis of Section 6.3.2 based on the Gaussian bound of Theorem 3 (without
any approximation); hence again, all the final key rates obtained in this subsection are
rigorous. We choose parameters Pmax, ǫcor are chosen to be the same as in the previous
subsection. According to Step (iii), we let s(ε) = 10.5 so that ε = 4.32×10−26 << Pmax.
The channel error rates are chosen to be QBER = 1%, 2.5%, and 5%, respectively.
Under these settings, for each fixed value of N , we performed numerical simulations
to select the optimal values of q and cmin that give the maximum value of F (c). That
is, we first fix N , and then search for the pair of q and cmin that is compatible with
the parameter check of Step (vi”) and gives the largest F (c). The results are shown in
Figure 2.
7.3. Exact Bounds Verses Approximate Bounds
All the key rates of the previous two subsections are rigorous, in the sense that they
are obtained without using any approximation. In this final subsection, we demonstrate
that, for practical parameter regions, the key rates are almost the same, whether one
uses the analysis based on the normal approximation (i.e., Proposition 1 and Theorem
2), or those without any approximation (i.e., Proposition 2 and Theorem 3).
In Fig. 3, the solid curve shows R(c) obtained in Section 7.1.1 with QBER=1%.
On the other hand, the dashed curve in the same figure is the key rate R(c) obtained for
the same values of QBER and Pmax, r, l, n by the procedure of Section 6.2.1; hence this
curve is obtained by using Proposition 1, and thus relies on the normal approximation
of Phg. Similarly in Fig. 4, the solid curve shows F (c) obtained in Section 7.1.2 with
QBER=5%, whereas the dashed curve is obtained by using Theorem 2, which relies on
the normal approximation (Here we performed the optimization of s and cmin).
Note that for both of these cases, the exact key rate and approximate key rate
are almost identical. These results suggest that the simple analysis using the normal
approximation (i.e., Proposition 1 or Theorem 2) can be justified for the security
evaluations of practical QKD systems.
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Figure 2. (Color online) Secret fraction F = (G − r)/N versus raw key length
N . Here we assume that Alice and Bob choose the x and the z bases with varying
probabilities q, 1−q. The probability q and the minimum errors cmin are also optimized
to give maximum F . The typical QBER are chosen to be 1% (red), 2.5% (blue), and
5% (black). Parameters Pph, ǫcor are chosen to be the same as in Figure 1, so that
Tmax + ǫcorr ≤ 10−10 is satisfied.
8. Summary
In this paper, we presented a concise analysis for the BB84 protocol that takes the finite
key effect into account and yields better key generation rates, with and without relying
on the normal approximation. Our results are indeed an improvement of preceding
literature; as we have shown in Figure 1, our analysis give better key generation rates
R in practical settings than in Refs. [2, 4].
In order to serve the convenience of experimentalists who wish to evaluate the
security of their QKD systems, we included explicit procedures of security evaluation in
Sections 3 and 6. In particular, in addition to presenting the exact values of key rates
and security parameters, we also presented how to obtain their rough estimates using
the normal approximation.
For the sake of simplicity, we restricted ourselves to the simple case where Alice
has a perfect single photon source. On the other hand, in order to achieve a long
communication distance by a practical QKD system using a weak coherent light source,
decoy pulses are necessary [28]. This situation was analyzed by one of the authors [1],
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Figure 3. Solid Curve: the same curve as the solid curve in Figure 1 with QBER=1%.
This curve is obtained by using Proposition 2, without using any approximation.
Dashed Curve: The final key rate R(c) obtained for the same values of QBER,
Pmax, r, l, n, using the straightforward bounds of Proposition 1; hence this curve is
obtained using the normal approximation. Note that the two curves are almost
identical.
relying on the normal approximation. A thorough and exact analysis in this direction
without any approximation remains as future work.
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Appendix A. Justification for the restricting the argument to the
generalized Pauli channel
The generalized Pauli channel is defined to be a channel where the phase error and the
bit errors occur stochastically (i.e., with a classical probability). It is easy to see that,
in this setting, the virtual phase error probability Pph after the privacy amplification,
mentioned in the main text, can clearly be defined. In Ref. [1], it is shown that the
trace distance can be bounded from above by using Pph.
Here we demonstrate that, without loss of generality, this argument can be extended
to the case where the quantum channel Λ between Alice and Bob is arbitrary and
general. First, we consider the discrete twirling. For n-bits sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn)
and z = (x1, . . . , zn), define the unitary matrix U(x, z) := (X
x1⊗Xx2⊗· · ·⊗Xxn)(Zz1⊗
Zz2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zzn), where X is the bit flip operator and Z the phase flip operator.
Then, the discrete twirling of Λ is defined as Λ :=
∑
z
2−2nΛ
z
, where z = (x, z) and
Λx,z(ρ) := U(x, z)Λ(U(x, z)ρU(x, z)
†)U(x, z)†. In this paper, we treat the phase error
and the bit error of the channel Λ due to the following reason.
Now, we denote the final state and the ideal state with the public information x
by ρA,E′|x(Λ) and ρIdeal|x(Λ) when the channel between Alice and Bob is Λ. Hence,
our security criterion is
∑
x Ppub(x)‖ρA,E′|x(Λ) − ρIdeal|x(Λ)‖1. Indeed, the distribution
Ppub(x) depends on the channel Λ in general, however, it does not change even if the
channel is replaced by Λ
z
because the initial random variable is uniform and the hash
function and error correction are linear. Also for the same reason, we have ‖ρA,E′|x(Λ)−
ρIdeal|x(Λ)‖1 = ‖ρA,E′|x(Λz) − ρIdeal|x(Λz)‖1. The state
∑
z
2−2nρA,E′|x(Λz) ⊗ |z〉〈z| and∑
z
2−2nρIdeal|x(Λz)⊗|z〉〈z| can be regarded as the state ρA,E′|x(Λ) and ρIdeal|x(Λ) because
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the classical information z can be treated as a part of Eve’s system with the channel Λ.
Hence, ∑
x
Ppub(x)‖ρA,E′|x(Λ)− ρIdeal|x(Λ)‖1
= ‖
∑
z
2−2n
∑
x
Ppub(x)‖ρA,E′|x(Λz)⊗ |z〉〈z| − ρIdeal|x(Λz)⊗ |z〉〈z|‖1
= ‖
∑
x
Ppub(x)‖
∑
z
2−2nρA,E′|x(Λz)⊗ |z〉〈z| −
∑
z
2−2nρIdeal|x(Λz)⊗ |z〉〈z|‖1
=
∑
x
Ppub(x)‖ρA,E′|x(Λ)− ρIdeal|x(Λ)‖1.
Therefore, it is enough to consider the case when the channel is Λ even if the used
channel Λ is not a Pauli channel.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove this lemma, we introduce several new lemmas. In the first part,
i.e, Appendix B.1, we derive exact upper bounds on Phg(c|k) given in terms of l or
s(ε). Then in Appendix B.2, we show that those upper bounds can also be bounded by
ε = Φ−1(s(ε)). Finally in Appendix B.3, using the obtained results, we prove Lemma 1.
Appendix B.1. Upper Bounds on sums of Phg(c|k)
Lemma 2 If l ≤ n and 1
n+l
≤ k
n+l
≤ 1
2
,
c∑
i=0
Phg(i|k) ≤ Dn,l,k(c), (B.1)
where
Dn,l,k(c) :=
√
n(n+ l − k)k
(n+ l)(n− k + c)(k − c)
× eµ2nh(k−cn )−(n+l)h( kn+l)+lh( cl ), (B.2)
µ :=
1
6n
+
1
12
. (B.3)
Proof: By using the Stirling’s formula
n! =
√
2πn
(n
e
)n
eλn with
1
12n+ 1
< λn <
1
12n
, (B.4)
we have (
n
k−c
)
(
n+l
k
) =
√
n(n+ l − k)k
(n+ l)(n− k + c)(k − c) (B.5)
× eµ′ 2nh(k−cn )−(n+l)h( kn+l)
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where
µ′ := λn − λn−k+c − λk−c − λn+l + λn+l−k + λk
< λn + λn+l−k + λk <
1
6n
+
1
12
for 1
n+l
≤ k
n+l
≤ 1
2
and l ≤ n. Combining (B.5) with∑ci=0 (li) ≤ 2lh( cl ) (see, e.g., Lemma
4.2.2 of [29]), we obtain (B.1). 
Lemma 3 For l ≤ n, c ≤ c¯(k), and k
n+l
< 1
2
nh
(
k − c
n
)
− (n+ l)h
(
k
n + l
)
+ lh
(c
l
)
≤ − 1
2 ln 2
(
c− c¯(k)
σ(k)
)2
. (B.6)
Proof: Since h′′′(x) decreases monotonically, we have
h(x) ≤ h(x0)+h′(x0)(x−x0)+ 1
2
h′′(x0)(x−x0)2+ 1
6
h′′′(x0)(x−x0)3.(B.7)
(Let h˜(x) be the LHS minus the RHS. It is easy to verify that h˜(x0) = h˜
′(x0) =
h˜′′(x0) = h˜′′′(x0) = 0 and that h˜′′′(x) = h′′′(x)− h′′′(x0) is a decreasing function. Then
by integrating h˜′′′(x) three times, one can show that h˜(x) ≤ 0.) Applying inequality
(B.7) for x0 =
k
n+l
and x = k−c
n
, and also for x = c
l
, we have
nh
(
k − c
n
)
− (n+ l)h
(
k
n + l
)
+ lh
(c
l
)
≤ 1
2
h′′
(
k
n+ l
)
n + l
nl
(c− c¯(k))2 (B.8)
+
1
6
h′′′
(
k
n+ l
){
1
n2
− 1
l2
}
(c¯(k)− c)3.
Since h′′′
(
k
n+l
)
, c¯(k)− c, and n− l are all non-negative by the conditions stated in the
lemma, the second term on the right hand side is non-positive. Then by noting
n+ l
nl
h′′
(
k
n+ l
)
= − 1
(ln 2)σ(k)2
n+ l
n + l − 1 ≤ −
1
(ln 2)σ(k)2
,
we have Inequality (B.6). 
Lemma 4 If c ≤ c¯(k), we have√
n(n + l − k)k
(n + l)(n− k + c)(k − c) ≤
√
n+ l
n
(B.9)
Proof: Let
C(n, l, k, c) :=
n2(n+ l − k)k
(n+ l)2(n− k + c)(k − c) .
Then it suffices to show C ≤ 1 for 0 ≤ c ≤ c¯(k).
The function f(k, c) := (n−k+c)(k−c) inside the square root is a concave parabola
with its vertex at c = k − n
2
. This means that f(k, c) ≥ min {f(k, c¯(k)), f(k, 0)},
and thus C(n, l, k, c) ≤ max{C(n, l, k, c¯(k)), C(n, l, k, 0)}. Then it is straightforward to
verity C(n, l, k, c¯(k)) = 1 and C(n, l, k, 0) ≤ 1. 
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Lemma 5 If l ≤ n, 1 ≤ k, c ≤ c¯(k) and k
n+l
≤ 1
2
, we have
c∑
i=0
Phg(i|k) ≤ eµ
√
n+ l
n
exp
[
−1
2
(
c− c¯(k)
σ(k)
)2]
. (B.10)
Proof: Combine Lemmas 2, 3 and 4. 
Lemma 6 If 0 ≤ t, c¯(k)− lt ≤ l/2 and k
n+l
≤ 1
2
,
c¯(k)−lt∑
c=0
Phg(c|k) ≤ exp
[
lt2
2
h′′
(
k
n+ l
)]
. (B.11)
Proof: According to [15],
c¯(k)−lt∑
i=0
Phg(i|k) ≤
((
p
p− t
)p−t(
1− p
1− (p− t)
)1−(p−t))l
= 2l[h(p−t)−h(p)+th
′(p)], (B.12)
where p = c¯(k)
l
= k
n+l
. Since h′′(x) increases monotonically for p− t ≤ x ≤ p ≤ 1/2, we
have
h(p− t) ≤ h(p) + (−t)h′(p) + (−t)
2
2
h′′(p).
That is,
l[h(p− t)− h(p) + th′(p)] ≤ lt
2
2
h′′(p)

Appendix B.2. Upper and Lower Bounds on Φ(x)
Lemma 7 The normal distribution function, defined in (19), is bounded as
√
2√
x2 + 2π
e−x
2/2 ≤ Φ(x) ≤
√
2
x
e−x
2/2. (B.13)
Proof: According to Ref. [14], the function Φ(x) satisfies
g˜pi(x)e
−x2/2 ≤ Φ(x) ≤ g˜4(x)e−x2/2, (B.14)
where
g˜k(x) :=
√
2k
(k − 1)x+√x2 + 2k . (B.15)
Then it is straightforward to show that for k, x > 0,
√
2√
x2 + 2k
≤ g˜k(x) ≤
√
2
x
. (B.16)
Combining (B.14) and (B.16), we obtain the lemma. 
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Lemma 8 If ε = Φ(s), and 2 ≤ s,
e−s
2 ≤ ε
2
. (B.17)
Proof: From Lemma 7,
e−s
2 ≤ e−s2/2
√
s2 + 2π√
2
Φ(s) =
√
(s2 + 2π)e−s2
2
ε.
Then by noting (s
2+2pi)e−s
2
2
≤ 1
4
for 2 ≤ s, we obtain the lemma. 
Appendix B.3. Proof of Lemma 1
If k/(n+ l) ≤ 1
2
, by combining Lemmas 5 and 7, we obtain
⌊c¯−sσ⌋∑
c=0
Phg(i|k) ≤
√
n+ l
n
√
s2 + 2π
2
eµε.
On the other hand, if k/(n+ l) > 1
2
, by Lemma 6, we have
cmax∑
c=0
Phg(c|k) ≤
cmax∑
c=0
Phg (c|(n+ l)/2)
≤ exp
[
(1/2− 0.12)2l
2
h′′(1/2)
]
≤ e− 25 l ≤ e− s
2
2 . (B.18)
Then by using Lemma 7, we have
cmax∑
c=0
Phg(i|k) < e− 12s2 ≤
√
s2 + 2π
2
ε. (B.19)
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 1
Appendix C.1. Proof of Case 1
Since psft(k, c) =
k−c
n
≤ k
n
≤ cmin
l
= psmp(cmin), we have for arbitrary c ∈ [0, l],
g(k, c) = nh (psft(k, c))− nh (pˆsft,ε (max{c+ 2, cmin}))−D
≤ nh (psmp(cmin))− nh (pˆsft,ε(cmin))−D.
Further, from the concavity of h(x) and from the monotonicity of h′(x),
g(k, c) ≤ nh′(pˆsft,ε(cmin)) [psmp(cmin)− pˆsft,ε(cmin)]
≤ nh′(pˆsft,ε(cmax)) [psmp(cmin)− pˆsft,ε(cmin)] .
Then by using Eq. (25) and by noting that (psmp − pˆε)2 = 4γpˆε(1− pˆε) (see below Eq.
(23)),
g(k, c) ≤ − (n + l)h′(pˆsft,ε(cmax)) [pˆε(cmin)− psmp(cmin)]−D
= − (n + l)h′(pˆsft,ε(cmax))
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×
√
4γ
√
pˆε(cmin)(1− pˆε(cmin))−D
= − (1 + 4γ)s(ε)βσ ((n + l)pˆε(cmin))−D
≤ − ξmin,εs(ε)
2
ln 2
−D.
The last inequality follows by noting that ncmin/l ≤ (n + l)pˆε(cmin) ≤ (n + l)pˆε(cmax),
and thus −σ ((n+ l)pˆε(cmax)) ≤ −σ (ncmin/l). Then by using Lemma 8, we have for
1 < ξmin,ε and D = 1,
Spa(k, c) ≤ 2[g(k,c)]−+1 ≤ 2e−ξmin,εs(ε)2 < ε

Appendix C.2. Proof of Case 2
This part is immediate from the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Suppose 1 ≤ l ≤ n, 4γ ≤ 1. Then, for any integer k, any real number ε > 0
and any c ∈ [ c¯(k)− s(ε)σ(k), cmax ], we have
g(k, c) ≤ −β (c− (c¯(k)− s(ε)σ(k)) + 1)−D, (C.1)
with β defined in (36).
Proof: With h(x) being concave, and with pˆsft,ε(c) increasing monotonically,
g(k, c) ≤ − nh′(pˆsft,ε(c+ 2)) (pˆsft,ε(c+ 2)− psft(k, c))−D
≤ − nh′(pˆsft,ε(cmax + 2)) (pˆsft,ε(c+ 2)− psft(k, c))−D.
The quantity pˆsft,ε(c + 2)− psft(k, c) on the right hand side can be bounded as follows.
First note pˆsft,ε(c¯ − sσ) − psft(k, c¯ − sσ) = 0 by the definition of pˆsft,ε(c), given in (24)
and (25). Also by the definition of pˆsft,ε(c), we have that
dpˆsft,ε
dc
≥ 1
1+4γ
n+l
nl
− 1
n
, and
that ∂psft
∂c
= − 1
n
by the definition of psft(k, c); hence
∂
∂c
(pˆsft,ε − psft) ≥ 11+4γ n+lnl . Thus
pˆsft,ε(c¯− sσ + 2)− psft(k, c¯− sσ + 2) ≥ 21+4γ n+lnl . Then for c¯(k)− s(ε)σ(k) ≤ c, we have
pˆsft,ε(c+ 2)− psft(k, c) (C.2)
= (pˆsft,ε(c+ 2)− psft(k, c+ 2)) + (psft(k, c+ 2)− psft(k, c)) (C.3)
≥ 1
1 + 4γ
n + l
nl
(c− (c¯− sσ) + 2)− 2
n
(C.4)
≥ 1
1 + 4γ
n + l
nl
(c− (c¯− sσ) + 1) . (C.5)

Plugging this upper bound on g(k, c) (for D = 1) to Spa(k, c) (given in (13) and
(14)), we obtain Case 2 of Theorem 1.
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Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 3
Next we prove Theorem 3 starting from Theorem 1. In the following, s(ε) is simplified
to s.
Under the conditions of Case 1 of Theorem 1, inequality (34) holds independently
of the normal approximation, and thus we readily see that (49) holds.
Lemma 10 If 1 ≤ l ≤ n, 1 ≤ k, c ≤ c¯(k) and k
n+l
≤ 1/2, we have
Phg(c|k) ≤ e
µ+ν
√
2πσ((n + l)c/l)
exp
[
−1
2
(
c− c¯(k)
σ(k)
)2]
, (D.1)
with µ defined in (B.3), and
ν :=
1
12l
+
1
2(n+ l − 1) . (D.2)
Proof: By using the Stirling’s formula (B.4), we have(
l
c
)
≤
√
n
n+ l − 1
1√
2πσ((n+ l)c/l)
eν
′
2lh(c/l), (D.3)
where
ν ′ = λl − λl−c − λc ≤ λl < 1
12l
. (D.4)
Then by combining Inequality (D.3) with (B.5) and (B.6), and by using Lemma 4, we
obtain
Phg(c|k) ≤ e
µ+ 1
12l√
2πσ((n + l)c/l)
√
1 +
1
n + l − 1 exp
[
−1
2
(
c− c¯(k)
σ(k)
)2]
.
Then by noting√
1 +
1
n + l − 1 ≤
√
exp
(
1
n+ l − 1
)
= exp
(
1
2(n + l − 1)
)
,
we obtain the lemma. 
Lemma 11 If l ≤ n, 1 ≤ cmin, ncmin/l ≤ k, c¯(k)− sσ(k) ≤ c ≤ c¯(k) and kn+l ≤ 1/2, we
have
Phg(c|k) ≤ e
µ+ν√
1− s√
cmin
1√
2πσ(k)
exp
[
−1
2
(
c− c¯(k)
σ(k)
)2]
, (D.5)
with µ, ν defined in (B.3), (D.2)
Proof: From the definition of σ(k), we have
σ(k)
σ(k(1− sσ(k)/c¯(k))) ≤
1√
1− sσ(k)/c¯(k) .
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By noting that ncmin/l ≤ k, we have
σ(k)
c¯(k)
=
√
n
l(n + l − 1)
(
n + l
k
− 1
)
≤
√
n
l(n + l − 1)
(
l(n + l)
ncmin
− 1
)
=
√
n
l(n + l − 1)
(
l(n + l)− ncmin
ncmin
)
≤
√
n
l(n + l − 1)
(
l(n + l − 1)
ncmin
)
≤ 1√
cmin
.
Hence 1− sσ(k)
c¯(k)
≥ 1− s√
cmin
. The assumption yields that (n+ l)c/l ≥ k(1− sσ(k)/c¯(k)),
which implies
σ(k)
σ((n+ l)c/l)
≤ σ(k)
σ(k(1− sσ(k)/c¯(k))) ≤
1√
1− s√
cmin
.
Combining this inequality with Lemma 10, we obtain Lemma 11. 
Appendix D.1. Proof of Case 2
If k
n+l
≥ 1
2
, this case can be proved by exactly the same argument as in Appendix B.3
(Note here that the condition s2 ≤ cmin ≤ cmax ≤ 0.12l, appearing in Theorem 3, implies
5
4
s2 ≤ l). Hence in this subsection, we assume that k
n+l
< 1
2
. We also assume that 1 ≤ k,
because the case k = 0 is already considered in Case 1 of Theorem 1.
First we divide the right hand side of (37) into three parts,
cmax∑
c=0
Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c)
≤
⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋∑
c=0
Phg(c|k) +
⌊c¯(k)⌋−1∑
c=⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋+1
Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c)
+
cmax∑
c=⌊c¯(k)⌋
Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c). (D.6)
The first term on the right hand side can be bounded from above by Lemma 1. The
second term can be bounded as
⌊c¯(k)⌋−1∑
c=⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋+1
Phg(c|k)Spa(k, c)
≤
⌊c¯(k)⌋−1∑
c=⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋+1
Phg(c|k)2−β(c−(c¯(k)−sσ(k))+1)
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≤ e
µ+ν√
1− s√
cmin
1√
2πσ(k)
×
⌊c¯(k)⌋−1∑
c=⌊c¯(k)−sσ(k)⌋+1
exp
[
−1
2
(
c− c¯(k)
σ(k)
)2]
× 2−β(c−(c¯(k)−sσ(k))+1)
≤ e
µ+ν√
1− s√
cmin
1√
2π
∫ ∞
−s
dx e−x
2/22−βσ(k)(x+s)
≤ e
µ+ν√
1− s√
cmin
I2 (ξε(k)) .
Then I2 (ξε(k)) appearing in the last line can be bounded by Inequality (44). (Note
that the argument in the paragraph of Inequality (44) does not rely on the normal
approximation.)
The third summation on the right hand side of (D.6) can be bounded as
cmax+1∑
c=⌊c¯(k)⌋
Phg(c|k)2−β(c−(c¯(k)−sσ(k))+1)
≤
cmax+1∑
c=⌊c¯(k)⌋
Phg(c|k)2−β(c−(c¯(k)−sσ(k))+1)
≤ 2−βσ(k)s ≤ e−ξε(k)s2 ≤ εξε(k) ≤ ε2.
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 4:
First, we fix arbitrary ε′ > ε. Since the function h(x) and its derivative h′(x) are
uniformly continuous in the range [pmin, pmax], there exists an integer N such that
⌈nh (pˆsft,ε′(c+ 1))⌉ + 1 ≤ ⌈nh (psmp(c)) +
√
nh′ (psmp(c))
√
psmp(c)(1−psmp(c))(1+t)
4t
s(ε)⌉ for
n ≥ N and l ≥ tn. Using Theorem 1 of [30], we can choose constants C1 and C2 such
that Phg(c|k) ≤ 1√2pi
∫ ζc+1
ζc
e−x/2dx + C1(1+ζ
2
c )
σn,l(k)
exp(−C2ζ2c ). Here note that the constants
C1 and C2 are different from those defined in Theorem 1 of [30].
Using C3 :=
∫∞
−∞C1(1 + x
2) exp(−C2x2), we obtain
npmax∑
c=0
C1(1 + ζ
2
c )
σn,l(k)
exp(−C2ζ2c )min
{
2−β(c−(c¯−s(ε)σ)), 1
} ≤ C3
σn,l(k)
. (E.1)
Hence, Theorem 2 yields that
Pph,n,l ≤ (1 + δ′n)ε′ +
C3
mink:npmin≤k≤(n+l)(pˆsft,ε′(lpmax+1)) σn,l(k)
. (E.2)
where δ′n is the maxumum of δ given in Theorem 2 with the condition l ≥ tn.
Since minl:l≥tnmink:npmin≤k≤(n+l)(pˆsft,ε′(lpmax+1)) σn,l(k) → ∞ as n → ∞, we obtain
limn→∞maxl:l≥tn C3min
k:npmin≤k≤(n+l)(pˆsft,ε′ (lpmax+1))
σn,l(k)
= 0. Also we can show that δ′n → 0.
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Thus, we obtain limn→∞maxl:l≥tn Pph,n,l ≤ ε′. Since ε′ is an arbitrary real number
satisfying that ε′ > ε. Hence, limn→∞maxl:l≥tn Pph,n,l ≤ ε. 
